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2 Jan C. Willems Center for Systems and Control, ENTEG, Fac. Science and Engineering, University of




Quantised consensus has been used in the context of opinion dynamics. In this context
agents interact with their neighbours and they change their opinion according to their inter-
ests and the opinions of their neighbours. We consider various quantised consensus mod-
els, where agents have different levels of susceptibility to the inputs received from their
neighbours. The provided models share similarities with collective decision making models
inspired by honeybees and evolutionary games. As first contribution, we develop an evolu-
tionary game-theoretic model that accommodates the different consensus dynamics in a
unified framework. As second contribution, we study equilibrium points and extend such
study to the symmetric case where the transition probabilities of the evolutionary game
dynamics are symmetric. Symmetry is associated with the case of equally favourable
options. As third contribution, we study stability of the equilibrium points for the different
cases. We corroborate the theoretical results with some simulations to study the outcomes
of the various models.
1 Introduction
Multi-agent systems find numerous applications in various research areas. Agents interact and
make decisions according to their selfish interests and the behaviour of the other agents. A
topic of increasing interest in various research areas is the consensus problem. In this problem,
agents are represented as nodes of a graph, directed or undirected, and the existence of an
edge between two nodes denotes the ability of two agents to communicate. Then the goal is for
the nodes to seek agreement on a value of a common quantity or variable. These variables
include but are not limited to resources which agents want to share, their cooperation levels
and communication bandwidth [1, 2].
In this article we are interested in consensus problems where the decision variables of the
agents are discrete, i.e. their choices are integer numbers. In engineering sciences the consen-
sus problem when the decision variable is discrete is often called “quantised consensus”. It can
emerge due to: constraints in communications, bounded capacity of the memory of sensors
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and noisy measurements and discrete nature of the decision variables [1, 3–6]. Another
research area that considers discrete consensus variables is opinion dynamics [7–17].
The opinion of each agent is represented by an integer and the interacting agents can
change their opinions based on the input they receive from neighbors [18–20]. Henceforth,
the terms opinion and decision variable will be used interchangeably.
Under a macroscopic representation of the quantised consensus problem, agents interact
with their neighbours and change their actions with a certain probability. Depending on the
characteristics of the agents, i.e. crowd seeking or crowd adverse behaviour, these probabilities
depend on the number of agents selecting each decision variable.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. Firstly, a microscopic model, the quan-
tised consensus process, is considered. In this process agents are able to choose among three
possible options. A game is then developed which is equivalent to the consensus process. The
game is an evolutionary one with three available actions per player and describes the evolution
of the population from a macroscopic perspective. This game can be seen as an evolutionary
version of a two player strategic form game. Each player can be in one of three possible states,
namely coordinators, defectors and neutrals. The developed evolutionary game builds on the
notion of expected gain pairwise comparison which was first proposed in [21]. The relevance
of such a result is that we bring in a unified framework, namely the evolutionary game, five dif-
ferent consensus dynamics, which we refer to as Case 1 to 5. These cases model the impact of
other agents’ opinions to a single individual’s opinion through different reward functions.
Each reward function corresponds therefore to a different quantised consensus problem.
As second contribution, the proposed game is cast as a Markov process and the equilibrium
points are investigated through the analysis of the Markov chain. We obtain that the three ver-
tices of the simplex in R3 are all equilibrium points. These vertices correspond to the cases
where all the agents converge to the same option or remain all uncommitted. A fourth equilib-
rium point may be obtained which lies in the interior of the simplex and where the populations
committed to either one option or the other are related by a proportionality linear rule. We
study such an equilibrium point in the symmetric case where the transition probabilities from
and to the uncommitted state are symmetric.
As third contribution, we provide a stability analysis of the equilibrium points for each case.
Different stability properties are obtained depending on the agents’ behaviour and their ten-
dency to follow their peers.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, relevant work is provided. In Sec-
tion 3, we formulate the problem, and we introduce the corresponding game formulation. The
unified framework between the consensus models and the Markov processes which emanate
from the game theoretic formulation is also presented in this section. In Section 4, the analysis
of five different models which correspond to different agents behaviours is presented. In Sec-
tion 5, theoretical analysis of the proposed models and simulation results are presented. Finally
Section 6 contains a discussion on our findings and directions for future works.
2 Related Work
Consensus algorithms are considered as the canonical example when coordination mecha-
nisms in multi-agent systems are considered. Agents which use consensus algorithms aim to
reach agreement when the common value of interest is considered. This is achieved by taking
into account the pairwise interactions between agents. These interactions then are analysed
using consensus algorithms. Consensus algorithms have been used in order to find solutions
among others in wireless networks [22], distributed multi-agent optimization [23, 24], signal
processing [25], numerical estimation [26, 27] and opinion dynamics [20, 28].
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Various consensus algorithms have been proposed in the literature with a variety of features
studied depending on the research area they were introduced. In [29] a literature review of
opinion dynamics models is presented. The reviewed algorithms were classified in two catego-
ries depending on the usage or not of external information. Additionally in each category the
algorithms were separated to discrete and continuous depending on the form of the opinion
they use. In [30] another survey of various opinion dynamics is presented. In this survey opin-
ion dynamics are considered as a fusion process of individual opinions.
In [31] a Markov model for disease spreading is presented, after a brief literature review of
various epidemic and rumour spreading algorithms. In contrast to the proposed methodology,
in [31] constant transition probabilities were used in the Markov model.
In [32] the consensus of societies towards social norms were studied through evolutionary
games. The players of the game were penalised if they were observed to deviate from the norm. In
[33] various models of the influence of other agents’ opinions on an agent’s decision were studied.
An approach which considers local information in the consensus problem was proposed in [34].
The interconnection between consensus and distributed optimisation was studied in [23,
35]. The impact of different media and their particular size in shaping of an opinion is pre-
sented in [36].
In [37, 38] the convergence properties and the speed of convergence of gossip algorithms
have been studied for various network topologies. In these works, in contrast to this article,
continuous decision variables have been used by the agents, which lead to a different update
rule for the consensus algorithm. Additionally in the majority of the gossip algorithms an
aggregation of the opinions of each neighbour leads to a change to an agent’s opinion. In con-
trast, in this article since the decision variables are discrete the agents are influenced by the
popularity of that particular opinion according to their characteristics.
A bio-inspired methodology which can be used to model consensus of interacting agents
comes from bee colonies. Particularly, from the method which bees adopt in order to choose
their nesting site. Scouts are sent to potential places for nesting and depending on the suitabil-
ity of each place the scouts persuade, or “recruit”, the other uncommitted members by per-
forming a waggle dance. Additionally, in order to stop other scouts from recruiting more
uncommitted members, scouts committed to one option try to intercept the waggle dance of
scouts committed to a different option. This can be viewed as a form of cross-inhibitory signal.
In analogy with the agent based decision making; the waggle dance represents agents who
intend to influence other agents to be committed to the same opinion as the one they have.
The cross-inhibitory signal on the other hand are agents who attempt to persuade an agent to
a different opinion than the one it currently has. Alternatively, consider the case where the for-
mation of an opinion is a process with two parts. The first one is the influence of an agent’s
peers with the same opinion, which we assimilate to the waggle dance. The second one is the
influence of agent’s peers which have different opinion than his current one.
Using this formulation behaviours as opinionated agents and crowd seeking or crowd adverse
agents can be modelled. In particular, when the cross inhibitory signals are considered, the
degree of an opinionated individual can be modelled. An opinionated individual will need more
of his peers in order to change his opinion towards another one, than a less opinionated one.
When the waggle dance is considered a crowd seeking agent would choose the action which is
followed by the majority of his peers, and the opposite will happen for a crowd averse agent.
3 Generic problem formulation
In this article the influence that opinions of neighbouring agents have in the formation of an
agent’s opinion is modelled. The underlying assumption is that the agents are able to choose
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one of three possible states to be, denoted by X, Y and Z hereafter. Each state will correspond
to one of the possible options: “committed to opinion X”, “committed to opinion Y”, or not
committed to any opinion (“committed to opinion Z”). Agents can change their opinion from
X to Z or from Y to Z and from Z to X and Y.
3.1 Quantised consensus approach
Let the state of the reference agent at time t� 0, which is henceforth referred to as agent i, be
indicated by the variable wit 2 fX;Y;Zg.
This decision process can be cast as a quantised consensus problem. Consider the case of a
well mixed population ofN agents represented through a connected undirected graph
GðN ; EÞ. Each agent is represented as a node of the graph and an edge connects two nodes
if agents can interact, i.e. they are neighbours. Let w be the vector of the discretised decision
variables of all agents, we will write wit ¼ w to indicate that agent i’s decision at time t is w
and write witþ1ðw
i
t ¼ wÞ to denote the decision variable of the reference agent i at time t + 1
given that his value at time t was w, w 2 {X, Y, Z}. For convenience of notation in the rest of
the paper, if not otherwise stated, a variable without a time index will denote the variable at
time t.
The evolution of the agents’ decisions can be illustrated by the following generic quantised
consensus process, where p~w is the probability of transitioning if the generic set of rulesA are
satisfied:
witþ1ðwit ¼ wÞ ¼
(
~w;8 ~w 2 fX;Y;Zg; ~w 6¼ w with probabilility p~w under a set of rulesA;
w otherwise:
ð1Þ
Both the probabilities p~w and the set of rulesA will be introduced in the following sections,
distinguishing five different cases.
To each microscopic dynamics we will associate a Markov process representation which
describes the probability distribution of wit over the set {X, Y, Z}. In generic terms, the Markov
process model can be expressed as












½xt yt zt�: ð2Þ
3.2 A unified framework based on evolutionary game-theoretic
formulation
The aforementioned quantised consensus model is formulated from a microscopic perspective
which looks at a single agent, who was referred to as the reference agent i. From a macroscopic
perspective, which considers the evolution of the population over the three opinions, the dif-
ferent consensus dynamics can be cast as an evolutionary game. The relevance of such evolu-
tionary game model is that it provides a unified modelling framework accommodating the five
different opinion dynamics.
Before introducing the game-theoretic formulation, let us start by noting that the popula-
tion dynamics can be described via a Markov process in terms of x and y since x + y + z = 1.
An evolutionary game perspective on quantised consensus in opinion dynamics
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The equations of the system’s dynamics in discrete-time are:
xtþ1 ¼ xt   pXZxt þ pZXð1   xt   ytÞ;
ytþ1 ¼ yt   pYZyt þ pZYð1   xt   ytÞ;
ztþ1 ¼ ð1   xt   ytÞ   ðpZX þ pZYÞð1   xt   ytÞ þ pXZxt þ pYZyt:
ð3Þ
The third equation of (3) can be written as zt+1 = 1 − xt+1 − yt+1. Therefore (3) reduces to:
xtþ1 ¼ xt   pXZxt þ pZXð1   xt   ytÞ;
ytþ1 ¼ yt   pYZyt þ pZYð1   xt   ytÞ:
ð4Þ
To introduce the evolutionary game model, consider an identical payoff three action game
which is played over a population ofN individuals. Each player in this game chooses an action
proportionally to the expected gain pairwise comparison in accordance with the definition
provided in [21] which we copy and adapt below. The resulting evolutionary dynamics adds to
the ones surveyed in [39]. In particular we have the following definition for the expected gain,
which can be viewed as the fitness function of a player.
Definition 1. For a generic n × n pay-off matrix, A the expected gain of action i when the cur-




Iðaik   ajkÞxk; ð5Þ
where n is the number of available actions to the players, aik is the ikth element of matrix A, xk is
the fraction of players that have chosen action k and I ¼




The agents are now viewed as players and their opinions are referred to as actions. Let us
also denote the fraction of the population who are in state X as x, the fraction of the population
who are not committed (state Z) as z and the fraction of the population who are in state Y as y.
This is equivalent to the portion of agents whose opinions are wi = X, wi = Z and wi = Y respec-
tively. Since the population is constant the three fractions sum up to one, i.e. x + y + z = 1.
Given that transitions from X to Y are not allowed this should be also reflected in the pay-
off matrix by setting the rewards of these transitions to zero. Additionally, the rewards should
also reflect the tendency of the players to choose similar actions to other players and therefore
penalise deviations from others. We will briefly refer to such a phenomenon as crowd-seeking
behaviour. By taking this into account and considering that x + y + z = 1, the following pay-off






a11f1ð�Þ   a12f2ð�Þ 0















where fi(�) i = 1,. . ., 4 are arbitrary functions of x and y which will be defined later to accom-
modate the five different opinion dynamics. From (5), the transition probabilities between
An evolutionary game perspective on quantised consensus in opinion dynamics
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0209212 January 4, 2019 5 / 17
actions are given as follows:
pZX ¼ a11xf1ð�Þ; pXZ ¼ a12yf2ð�Þ;
pYZ ¼ a21xf3ð�Þ; pZY ¼ a22yf4ð�Þ:
ð7Þ
Substituting the above transition probabilities in (4) we obtain:
xtþ1 ¼ xt   a12f2ð�Þxtyt þ a11xtf1ð�Þð1   xt   ytÞ;
ytþ1 ¼ yt   a21f3ð�Þxtyt þ a22ytf4ð�Þð1   xt   ytÞ;
ð8Þ
which is the dynamics we analyse in the rest of this paper.
The resulting evolution of x, y and z are described by the Markov process which is depicted
in Fig 1.
4 Analysis of particular models
In this section various opinion dynamics mechanisms are presented. Each of them represents
a different kind of influence that the neighbours of an agent have in his opinion formation pro-
cess. These models are build on different assumptions about how many of peers are needed to
influence an agent to adopt a specific opinion. Following the jargon of bio-inspired collective
decision making, the five cases considered in this article can be catalogued in terms of strength
of the cross-inhibitory and the waggle dance signals. More specifically, in Case 1 both the
cross-inhibitory and the waggle dance signals are linear. These can be considered as “broad
minded” agents since they can reconsider their decisions by taking into account only the state
of a single neighbour.
In Case 2 one observes a weak cross-inhibitory and a strong waggle dance signal. This sec-
ond case deals with stubborn agents who compare the decisions of more than one of their
neighbours in order to change their opinion with a given probability.
In Case 3 we have a strong cross-inhibitory and a weak waggle dance signal. The third case
deals with stubbornness of uncommitted agents. Consider a reference agent who is not com-
mitted, i.e. his opinion is wi = Z. He commits to opinion X or Y only if m randomly chosen
neighbours have opinion X or Y, respectively. Committed agents use the opinion of a single
randomly chosen neighbour.
Cases 4 and 5 are similar to Case 1. The difference is that the probabilities of changing opin-
ion depend solely on the percentage of the peers that belong to one of the two opinions X and
Y denoted by ~x and ~y respectively.
LetMt andDt denote two sets of m and d randomly selected neighbours of the reference
agent i at time t. The generic form of the quantised consensus process for a set of decision
Fig 1. Markov chain emerging from the generic form of A.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0209212.g001
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t ¼ XÞ ¼
(
Z with probabilility p1; if w
j
t ¼ Y; 8j 2Mt
X otherwise;
ð9Þ
witþ1ðwit ¼ YÞ ¼
(
Z with probabilility p2; if w
j
t ¼ X; 8j 2Mt;
Y otherwise;
ð10Þ
witþ1ðwit ¼ ZÞ ¼
(
X with probabilility p3; if w
j
t ¼ X; 8j 2 Dt;
Y with probabilility p4; if w
j
t ¼ Y; 8j 2 Dt;
Z otherwise:
ð11Þ
The cardinality of the setsM andD changes according to each case and are summarised in
Table 1.
Fig 2. A generic quantised consensus process. Individual X meets m Individuals Y and mutates into Individual Z
with probability PXZ = p1 (top-left); Individual Y meets m Individuals X and mutates into Individual Z with probability
PYZ = p2 (top-right); Individual Z meets d Individuals X and mutates into Individual X with probability PZX = p3
(bottom-left); Individual Z meets d Individuals Y and mutates into Individual Y with probability PZY = p4 (bottom-
right).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0209212.g002
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The corresponding transition matrix P of the Markov process can be defined as:
P ¼
ð1   p1ÞIMy þ ð1   IMyÞ 0 p1IMy
0 ð1   p2ÞIMx þ ð1   IMxÞ p2IMx







where IMx and IMy, IDx and IDy are defined as:
IMx ¼
(












1 if wjt ¼ Y; 8j 2 Dt;
0 otherwise:
and ~IDxy ¼ 1   IMx   IMy:
Analytical definitions of the consensus process and their corresponding transition probabil-
ities for each case are provided in S1 File.
5 Results
In this section theoretical and simulation results are presented for various opinion dynamics
models.
5.1 Theoretical results
We are in the position to establish the first main result that states that the five opinion dynam-
ics can be formulated in a unified framework as evolutionary game dynamics for different
choices of the functions fi(�), i = 1,. . ., 4.
Theorem 1. The evolutionary game (8) describes the population dynamics in Cases 1 to 5 for
the following choices of functions fi(.), i = 1,. . ., 4:
ðCase 1Þ f1ð�Þ ¼ 1; f2ð�Þ ¼ 1; f3ð�Þ ¼ 1; f4ð�Þ ¼ 1;
ðCase 2Þ f1ð�Þ ¼ 1; f2ð�Þ ¼ ym  1; f3ð�Þ ¼ xm  1; f4ð�Þ ¼ 1;
ðCase 3Þ f1ð�Þ ¼ xm  1; f2ð�Þ ¼ 1; f3ð�Þ ¼ 1; f4ð�Þ ¼ ym  1;






; f4ð�Þ ¼ 1;
ðCase 5Þ f1ð�Þ ¼
1
xþ y





The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in S2 File.
Table 1. Cardinality of neighbour sets and probabilities of changing opinion for each case.
jMj jDj p1 p2 p3 p4
Case 1 1 1 p1 p2 p3 p4
Case 2 m 1 p1 p2 p3 p4
Case 3 1 d p1 p2 p3 p4
Case 4 1 1 p1 1~xþ~y p2
1
~xþ~y p3 p4
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The equilibrium points of the various models of the previous section was also studied.












¼ ð1   xt   ytÞ:
ð14Þ
The above can equivalently be written as
a12f2ð�Þxtyt ¼ a11xtf1ð�Þð1   xt   ytÞ;
a21f3ð�Þxtyt ¼ a22ytf4ð�Þð1   xt   ytÞ:
ð15Þ
which implies:
yta12f2ð�Þa22f4ð�Þ ¼ xta11f1ð�Þa21f3ð�Þ: ð16Þ
In the next theorem we show that the vertices of the simplex in R3 are equilibrium points
and that there exists a fourth equilibrium point which satisfies the linear condition y = qx for
given scalar q� 0.
Theorem 2. The following tuples are equilibrium points for the evolutionary game (8):
ðx ¼ 1; y ¼ 0; z ¼ 0Þ; ðx ¼ 0; y ¼ 1; z ¼ 0Þ; ðx ¼ 0; y ¼ 0; z ¼ 1Þ:
In addition, a fourth equilibrium point may exist of type (x, qx, 1 − (1 + q)x).
The analytical form of the equilibrium types for the particular cases and the proof of Theo-
rem 2 are provided in S3 File.
In the above theorem, the equilibrium point y = qx may be outside the simplex inR3 which
would make it not feasible. In the following, we investigate the conditions of feasibility in the
case of symmetric parameters where q’ 1.
A list of the equilibrium points of the form y = qx and their corresponding feasibility condi-
tions, in the symmetric case where q’ 1 are provided in the corollary in S4 File.
A way to study the stability of the equilibrium solutions is to study the eigenvalues of the
Jacobian matrix J of the state space non-linear model, for each case, evaluated in each equilib-
rium point. Let λ = {λ1, λ2} be the eigenvalues of the Jacobian, then if evaluated in a specific
solution |λi|< 1, i 2 {1, 2} this solution is stable. We are ready to establish the following stabil-
ity properties.
Theorem 3. Depending on the case considered the vertices of the simplex and the tuple (x, qx,
1 − (1 + q)x) can be stable equilibria.
The form of the equilibria and proof of Theorem 3 for each case are provided in S5 File.
5.2 Simulations
In this section we provide some simulations to corroborate the theoretical results of the previ-
ous sections. Examples of the dynamics for the weak and strong cross inhibitory signal cases
are depicted in Fig 3.
The interconnection between the quantised consensus models and their corresponding
Markov process is shown for various reward matrices and uniformly chosen initial conditions.
Random graphs, “Erdős-Re´nyi” networks [40], were used for the set-up of the quantised con-
sensus formulation. In particular a graph GðN ;EÞ with 1000 agents was generated, and the
An evolutionary game perspective on quantised consensus in opinion dynamics
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neighbours of each agent were uniformly chosen among the availableN   1 agents with prob-
ability p = 0.2.
When a random graph is generated there is no guarantee of the minimum number of
neighbours that agents will have. Some of the quantised consensus models of this article
require that each agent will have at least m neighbours. For this reason in each simulation
instance when a graph was generated, if the number of neighbours of any agent was less than
m it was discarded. The process was repeated until a graph is generated with all nodes having
at least m neighbours.
The initial values of the decision variable w0 were uniformly chosen. Then based on the
same w0 and GðN ;EÞ the five quantised consensus processes were used as coordination mech-
anism among the agents. The distribution of the agents among the three categories in each
time step is reported.
The analysis of the evolution of the players’ behaviour, when the Markov process is consid-
ered, is indifferent to the structure of GðN ;EÞ. Therefore for the initialisation of the five Mar-
kov processes only the proportion of cooperators, defectors and neutrals in w0 was needed.
Four instances of the aforementioned process were considered. Each of them for different

























Fig 3. Phase portraits of the Markov decision processes.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0209212.g003
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The results of all four initial conditions are depicted in Fig 4. The results presented are for 200
iterations of both processes, consensus and Markov chains.
In all figures the quantised consensus and the Markov processes produce similar results.







outcome of the quantised consensus algorithm is also studied. Uniformly chosen initial condi-
tions were used for the portion of the population which belonged to X, Y and Z respectively.







. The yellow corresponds to the cases where the whole population was in
state X while the dark blue one corresponds to the cases where no agent was belonging to state
X. As it can be observed, the highest the value of a21a22 the highest the chances were to converge to
X independently of the value of a12a11.
The previous simulation results are for highly connected networks which can be considered
as well mixed populations. In addition the structure of the network was randomly created. In
order to study the behaviour of the proposed methodology in structured environments small
world networks [41] were employed. On these ring-structured networks each agent is con-
nected with K
2
, 0 < K � N   1 nodes on each side of the ring. It has been showed [42–44],
that the structure of the small world networks affects the speed of convergence of various con-
sensus algorithms. Therefore it is possible because of the structure of small world networks
that the quantised consensus algorithms and their corresponding Markov models will con-
verge to different outcomes.
In order to study the discrepancy between the quantised consensus and the Markov process
in structured networks, the following experiments were employed. A Watts-Strogatz graph
was created with 100 nodes connected with K
2
neighbours in each side and rewire probability p.
The number of instances that both processes converged to the same decision were counted.
These results are considered with regards to the number of connections that an agent can have
An evolutionary game perspective on quantised consensus in opinion dynamics
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and the impact that the reward function has. Since at least m neighbours are needed for the
Cases 2-5, we haveK ¼ mþ j; j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 15; 20g. In the simulations the
case where m = 3 is considered. The simulations depicted in Fig 6 are of 100 replications of a
network with the sameK and random rewards aij, i, j 2 {1, 2}. In each replication both pro-
cesses were repeated for 200 iterations. In order to take into account the importance of each
opinion, and thus the rewards, the fraction
a11a21
a22a12
is used. Which increases when opinion X is
more important, i.e. has greater reward, and decreases when opinion Y is more important.
The results for case one are depicted in the first panel of Fig 6. The two processes result in
the same decision as the value of
a11a21
a22a12
increases and the number of neighboursK increases.
The decisions of the two processed for the Cases 2,4 and 5, second fourth and fifth panel of
Fig 6 respectively, depend more on the reward function rather than onK. On the other hand,
in the third case the structured environment seems to influence the algorithms in a way that
only when the importance of X is very high they converge to the same decision.
6 Discussion
The interconnection between agent-based decision-making and centralised decision-making
through game theory is studied. In this article a scenario where agents that change their opin-
ions depending on their peers is considered. Changes of opinions were modelled using a biol-
ogy-inspired process based on the way bees choose the place of their next beehive.
Fig 4. Simulation results. The players in X, Y and Z, are depicted as straiht, dashed and dotted lines in the figures.
Each row represent one of the five cases. The left column corresponds to the results of the Markov process and the
right column to the quantised consensus process. The x-axis corresponds to the iteration number and the y-axis to the
distribution of the population over the three states.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0209212.g004
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Fig 6. Simulation results for the X population when small world networks are considered. Dark blue colour
denotes that quantised consensus and the markov chain resulted in the same decision in all the simulations. When
yellow colour denotes that the results were the same only on the 40% of the cases. The x-axis corresponds to the
minimum number of neighbours that an agent could have, in addition to the m neighbours which were necessary to
have. The y-axis represents the various values of a11a21a22a12.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0209212.g006
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Using the ideas of cross inhibitory signals, bees’ waggle dance and a quantised consensus
process, different agent’s behaviours were formulated in the same model. This includes opin-
ionated agents and crowd seeking or crowd averse agents. These behaviours were model based
on the number of neighbours a person needed in order to change his opinion.
A game-theoretic approach was presented as a unifying formulation to the quantised con-
sensus problem. Based on the expected gain pay-off function the quantised consensus process
was cast as an evolutionary game. It was shown that for a game with three possible action
“committed to opinion X”, “committed to opinion Y” and “not committed to any opinion” the
game theoretic representation is equivalent to the quantised consensus process for well mixed
populations.
The equilibria and their stability were analysed using the corresponding Markov process of
each case. In all cases the whole population would eventually converge to a single opinion X, Y
or Z. Exemption is the case of strong cross-inhibition signal where opinion Z is not a stable
equilibrium. In this case it is also possible to observe a stable mixed equilibrium among the
three opinions.
The impact that rewards have in the outcome of the processes have been also studied






had in the deci-
sion process. In all cases there is an area where the process will always converge to a single
opinion depending on which fraction is greater. Therefore if the rewards, value of an opinion,
are sufficiently large the outcome will always converge to that opinion given a randomly cho-
sen initial state of the population.
The validity of the results on structured networks was also studied through simulations, in
small world networks. In the simulations of Case 1, if the rewards of an action and the number
of an agent’s neighbours are sufficiently large, the quantised consensus process and the Mar-
kov process produce the same results. When Cases 2,4 and 5 are considered, similar results
obtained when the reward of an action was excreting the other rewards by a certain level. The
number of neighbour an agent had small or no effect on the number of instances that the two
process produced the same results in those 3 cases. On the third case the number of neighbours
is not mainly influences the results. Additionally, in this case the two processes have similar




results indicate that for some of the cases studied it is possible to use the Markov process in
structure environments as an alternative under specific conditions.
Among various future research directions an interesting extension of the current work is
the study of an inhomogeneous case where some players are more important to their neigh-
bours than others. In addition similarly to [45] the case where some “malicious” agents/players
try to influence the equilibrium of the game will be studied.
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